A community of 30,000 US Transcriptionist serving Medical Transcription Industry
BAGHDAD – The U.S. Defense Department is unable to properly account for over 95 percent of $9.1 billion in Iraqi oil money tapped by the U.S. for rebuilding the war ravaged nation, according to an audit released Tuesday.
The report by the U.S. Special Investigator for Iraq Reconstruction offers a compelling look at continued laxness in how such funds were being spent in a country where people complain basic services like electricity and clean water are sharply lacking seven years after the U.S.-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein.
The audit found that shoddy record keeping by the Defense Department left the Pentagon unable to fully account for $8.7 billion it withdrew between 2004 and 2007 from a special fund set up by the U.N. Security Council. Of that amount, Pentagon "could not provide documentation to substantiate how it spent $2.6 billion."
The funds are separate from the $53 billion allocated by Congress for rebuilding Iraq.
The report comes at a critical time for Iraq, which four months after inconclusive elections squabbling political factions have still not agreed on a new government.
Despite security gains made since 2008, bombings remain near a daily occurrence that compound the frustrations and fears of Iraqis increasingly weary of the political crisis — one many say reflects how the country's politicians are more interested in their own interests than those of the nation.
The continuing impasse was highlighted on Tuesday when Iraqi lawmakers gathered for the second time this month only to indefinitely postpone the parliamentary session because there was still no decision on the new government.
Acting speaker Fouad Massoum told reporters that the postponement was designed to give the political blocs more time to discuss contentious issues and agree on the distribution of positions in the new government.
"With every delay, the suffering of the Iraqi people and security risks are increasing," lawmaker Salman al-Jumaili told reporters, criticizing the move.
The U.S. audit is unlikely to do anything but further stoke that frustration felt by Iraqis who continue to suffer from poor infrastructure despite the billions spent.
The audit cited a number of factors behind the inability to account for most of the money withdrawn by the Pentagon from the Development Fund for Iraq.
It said most of the Defense Department organizations that received DFI money failed to set up Treasury Department accounts, as required. In addition, it said no Defense Department organization was designated as the main body to oversee how the funds were accounted for or spent. "The breakdown in controls left the funds vulnerable to inappropriate uses and undetected loss," the report said.
Calls to Iraqi officials for comment went unanswered.
The Defense Department, in responses attached to the audit, said it agreed with the recommendations laid out in the report about establishing better guidelines for monitoring such funds, including appointing an organization to be responsible for overseeing such funds mostly likely by November.
The audit found that the U.S. continues to hold about $34.3 million of the money even though it was required to return it to the Iraqi government.
The audit did not indicate that investigators believed there were any instances of fraud involved in the spending of these funds.
The DFI includes revenues from Iraq's oil and gas exports, as well as frozen Iraqi assets and surplus funds from the now-defunct, Saddam Hussein-era oil-for-food program.
With the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority, which ran Iraq shortly after the start of the U.S. invasion in 2003 until mid-2004, about $20 billion was placed into the account.
The Iraqi government had agreed to allow the U.S. continued access to the funds after the CPA was dissolved in 2004, but it revoked that authority in December 2007.
In other developments, seven people were killed in a series of bombings and apparent assassinations in Baghdad and Mosul, a northern city where al-Qaida is believed to still have a strong presence. Among those killed were two women shot dead in their home by gunmen and a Baghdad electricity official who died of wounds sustained after a morning roadside bombing.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100727/..._mi_ea/ml_iraq
You said "Gitmo. January 22, 2009, prosecutions were suspended and all pending cases subjected to review. File "mismanagement" (I am so sure) from the previous administration prolonged this process. December 15, 2009, the detention center was formally closed and the detainees ordered transferred to the Thomson Correctional Center in Illinois. "
Since when? The detainees weren't transferred to Thomson. In fact, last I knew, they were debating about even buying it because of the cost to renovate it. I know all the prosecutions were suspended but didn't know the detainees were in our country. Where did you read/see this?
I also didn't hear about the Afghan pull out in 2011 and I read and hear the news all day long when I'm not working. I know they are to be gone completely from Iraq in August 2011.
As for the war in Iraq, I will say it again. When Colin Powell was at the UN asking for sanctions against SH for booting out the UN inspectors, there WERE photos of WMDs shown then. I watched that hearing on TV. By the time the US went into Iraq, they were gone. Why and where? Iraq knew, because of the UN conference, that the US might step in and the UN dragged their feet long enough for Sadam to move the weapons to his closest ally. Speculation is they mostly went to Syria but no proof.
Say what you want, but I still believe Sadam did have WMDs and they were moved. You want to blame someone, blame the UN and blame the CIA for not following up on it to give proof where the WMDs went.
Here’s an article I think you’ll really find interesting:
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Ronald_Reagan/Reagan_WMD_Saddam.html
Now, if you have time, read this report. It is very extensive. The addendum itself is 92 pages. I did not get into the rest of the report yet because of the hundreds of pages presented. I only read the 92 pages so far.
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/DuelferRpt/Addendums.pdf
And finally, the below was an interview on 60 minutes with the man who spent months with Saddam after his capture. The interview in type is 6 pages long, but I am only posting the WMD info.
The subject of weapons of mass destruction was the most important mystery Piro was trying to answer. It would take him five months to bring up the question.
Piro debriefed Saddam for the Iraq Survey Group, the people President Bush sent to figure out what had happened to the weapons of mass destruction. Piro's goal was to sit with Saddam month after month to tease out the truth over time and it dawned on Piro that Saddam fancied himself quite a writer: he wrote poetry every day, and in Saddam’s pride of authorship Piro found an opening.
"What did you think of the poetry?" Pelley asks.
"Most of them [the poems] were actually terrible," Piro says, laughing. "Some days I thought I didn't get paid enough to listen to them."
But Piro didn't tell Saddam his real opinion. "I told him they were great," he says.
And with that flattery, Saddam began to boast that he wrote all his own speeches too. That was Piro's chance.
"And I said, absolutely. I saw that. Except there was a couple of speeches that I really didn't see the same writing style. That same passion, emotion that I had seen in his poetry. So I figured those speeches must have been written by someone else. By a speechwriter. And he was kind of surprised. And he asked me what speeches. And I said, 'Well, funny you should ask. And in June 2000 you gave a speech in where you said Iraq would not disarm until others in the region did. A rifle for a rifle, a stick for a stick, a stone for a stone,'" Piro recalls.
That June 2000 speech was about weapons of mass destruction. In talking casually about that speech, Saddam began to tell the story of his weapons. It was a breakthrough that had taken five months.
"Oh, you couldn't imagine the excitement that I was feeling at that point," Piro remembers.
"And what did he tell you about how his weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed?" Pelley asks.
"He told me that most of the WMD had been destroyed by the U.N. inspectors in the '90s. And those that hadn't been destroyed by the inspectors were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq," Piro says.
"So why keep the secret? Why put your nation at risk, why put your own life at risk to maintain this charade?" Pelley asks.
"It was very important for him to project that because that was what kept him, in his mind, in power. That capability kept the Iranians away. It kept them from reinvading Iraq," Piro says.
Before his wars with America, Saddam had fought a ruinous eight year war with Iran and it was Iran he still feared the most.
"He believed that he couldn't survive without the perception that he had weapons of mass destruction?" Pelley asks.
"Absolutely," Piro says.
"As the U.S. marched toward war and we began massing troops on his border, why didn't he stop it then? And say, 'Look, I have no weapons of mass destruction.' I mean, how could he have wanted his country to be invaded?" Pelley asks.
"He didn't. But he told me he initially miscalculated President Bush. And President Bush's intentions. He thought the United States would retaliate with the same type of attack as we did in 1998 under Operation Desert Fox. Which was a four-day aerial attack. So you expected that initially," Piro says.
Piro says Saddam expected some kind of an air campaign and that he could he survive that. "He survived that once. And then he was willing to accept that type of attack. That type of damage," he says.
"Saddam didn't believe that the United States would invade," Pelley remarks.
"Not initially, no," Piro says.
"Once it was clear to him that there was going to be an invasion of the country. I mean, did he actually believe that his armies could win?" Pelley asks.
"No," Piro says. "What he had asked of his military leaders and senior government officials was to give him two weeks. And at that point it would go into what he called the secret war."
"The secret war. What did he mean?" Pelley asks.
"Going from a conventional to an unconventional war," Piro says.
"So the insurgency was part of his plan from the very beginning," Pelley remarks.
The Piro interviews with Saddam turned up other revelations about one of the most notorious war crimes of his regime: the use of chemical weapons on Kurdish civilians in 1988. Iraq gassed its own people in something called the Anfal campaign to counter Iranian incursions and Kurdish resistance to his rule.
Piro says Saddam told him he himself gave the orders to use chemical weapons against the Kurds in the North. When shown the graphic pictures of the aftermath, Piro says Saddam reacted by saying, "Necessary."
In fact, Piro says Saddam intended to produce weapons of mass destruction again, some day. "The folks that he needed to reconstitute his program are still there," Piro says.
"And that was his intention?" Pelley asks.
"Yes," Piro says.
"What weapons of mass destruction did he intend to pursue again once he had the opportunity?" Pelley asks.
"He wanted to pursue all of WMD. So he wanted to reconstitute his entire WMD program," says Piro.
"Chemical, biological, even nuclear," Pelley asks.
"Yes," Piro says.
In the summer of 2004, legal custody of Saddam transferred from the U.S. to Iraq. And Saddam had no illusions about what that meant. "Prosecution and execution," Piro says.
Piro says Saddam expected to die and that it didn't bother him.
Why not?
"Well, his answer was is he was 67 at the time. He had lived longer than the average Arab male lived in the Middle East. He had a wonderful life. Got to be the leader of the cradle of civilization. And in his opinion, of course, had a significant impact on that country. The region. The world. So he was not bothered by having to face death," Piro says.
"No remorse? No concern for the kinds of things that he had ordered and done?" Pelley asks.
"No. No remorse," Piro says. "No regret."